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Introduction by Thomas A. Schwartz, Vanderbilt University
It is with a degree of modesty and some awkwardness that I write the introduction to a roundtable
about a book which was inspired by something I wrote. Luke Nichter notes in the acknowledgments
that his Richard Nixon and Europe seeks to do for the Nixon engagement with the old continent what
my Lyndon Johnson and Europe did for that presidency’s policy toward Europe. But as Geir
Lundestad so helpfully points out in his review, Nichter also rejects the central argument of my book
in shaping his account of the Nixon presidency and its ‘reshaping’ of Atlantic relations. I argued that
[1]
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Johnson was a relatively successful custodian of the Atlantic alliance and left it in good shape in 1969,
while Nichter’s book begins by arguing that when Nixon’s presidency begins, U.S.-European relations
were at “their lowest point” since World War II (1). Actually this put me in mind of the wise words of
my late adviser, Ernest May, when I asked him about a controversial claim I wanted to make in an
article. Responding to my excessive agonizing, May remarked, ‘You could be wrong, but so what?
You just acknowledge the mistake.’ In that spirit I would encourage readers to compare our
approaches to the issues that consumed American and European diplomats during these years, and to
the presidential leadership of Johnson and Nixon, exercised rightly or wrongly. Whatever one makes
of our disagreement, Nichter’s book does bring new focus to a region of the world which has been
largely neglected in the Nixon literature, which has focused much more on Nixon and his famous
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger’s Vietnam policies, dealings with the Soviet Union and
China, and involvements in the Third World. Nichter, whose publishing credentials include two
widely heralded books with Douglas Brinkley on the Nixon tapes, has done an impressive degree of
research in European archives, covering five countries as well as the archives of NATO and the
European Union, then known as the EEC, or European Economic Community. All the reviewers
marvel at the scope of his archival research, even when they dispute some of his conclusions.
[2]

Perhaps not surprisingly, Lundestad is the most severe critic of the Nichter book. Those of us who
know and admire Geir from his work at the Norwegian Nobel Institute also realize that he never
holds back in his critiques, and as the informal dean of studies of America’s ‘empire by invitation’ in
Europe, he makes clear what he regards as the shortcomings of Nichter’s argument. Lundestad
faults Nichter for lacking an overarching or central thesis, which might tie together his treatment of
such disparate topics as Nixon’s attempt to give NATO new dimensions, his decision to end the
Bretton Woods system, and the sharp disputes which he occasioned with the allies over their
response to the Yom Kippur War. He also points out the irony that in a book about Nixon’s European
policy that his successor, Gerald Ford, actually emerges as something of the hero, as Ford helped to
mend relations with Europe after the particularly nasty turn which things took during the twilight of
Nixon’s presidency. Lundestad also challenges several of claims put forth in Nichter’s book. He is
skeptical of the significance of the Year of Europe as well as the argument that Nixon’s economic
measures led to the European Monetary System. In particular, Lundestad sees the Nixon and
Kissinger years as a reversal of the previous position of the United States in support of European
integration, and a period when Nixon’s sense of America’s relative decline led him to see in a more
unified Europe a threat to America’s interests. Rather than see Nixon and Europe in the positive
light Nichter puts forward, Lundestad quotes J. Robert Schaetzel, the U.S. Ambassador to the
European Community during this time, to the effect that the United States lost interest in
encouraging a strong and integrated Europe.
[3]

[4]

The other two contributors to the roundtable are considerably more positive in their assessment of
Nichter’s contribution. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou singles out Nichter’s extensive treatment of the end
of the Bretton Woods system, especially Nichter’s careful use of the White House tapes.
Hatzivassiliou praises Nichter’s “excellent analysis” of the Washington battles taking place during
this time, especially the struggle between Kissinger and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, who
was far more prone to unilateralism in his treatment of Europe. The one major criticism which
Hatzivassiliou makes is that Nichter does not engage as much with the European historiography on
these years, especially the treatment of the negotiations over the Commission on Security and
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Cooperation in Europe, otherwise known as the Helsinki Commission. Hatzivassiliou sees Nichter’s
work as covering a period of transition in the Atlantic relationship, and praises it for providing a
“convincing picture” of the Nixon and Kissinger attempt to place the relationship on a new
foundation.
Nigel Bowles is the most enthusiastic reviewer, calling Richard Nixon and Europe a “commanding
book.” Bowles emphasizes its extraordinary archival richness as well as its chapters on the end of
Bretton Woods, which he terms “outstanding pieces of historical analysis.” Bowles is particularly
intrigued by the parallels between the events of the Nixon era and the contemporary 2016 issues
affecting U.S.-European relations. The fact that a great deal of Nichter’s book concerns the
relationship between Britain and Europe, both in Prime Minister Edward Heath’s efforts to join and
then Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s attempt to stay in Europe, conjures up strikingly similar
parallels to David Cameron’s current campaign to prevent the BREXIT referendum from passing this
coming June 23. Bowles also sees a parallel in the degree to which the Nixon era was one of overall
American retrenchment, with a strong emphasis on the need for the Europeans to do more for their
own security. Finally, just as in 1973 the issues of the Middle East would roil the alliance during the
October war and the oil embargo, now in 2016 the Middle East disturbs Europe’s equilibrium with
the migration crisis and the threat of terrorism. As Bowles sees it, history “does not offer repeat
performances, but themes in relations between nation states and alliances nonetheless recur in
modified forms,” a rather more sophisticated way of stating the Mark Twain aphorism that ‘History
doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme a lot.’ For Bowles, the Nichter book is very welcome, coming
at a time when both Americans and Europeans need to be reminded of the history of their
relationship, and especially the importance of the American security guarantee in helping to keep
Europe together as a political force.
Luke Nichter’s book is clearly an important contribution to the historiography of America’s most
important post-1945 relationship, and one which has played an essential role in maintaining
international peace and global prosperity. Yet our current political situation leads one to doubt
Bowles’s expressed belief that “the transatlantic relationship remains vital to the United States and
its European partners for reasons of politics, security, trade, and culture.” These words strike a
chord in my internationalist heart, but in an election season when ‘America First’ has resurfaced as
the foreign policy principle of the Republican nominee, it is an open question whether the
relationship will survive intact. The thought of a future “Donald Trump and Europe” book is
frightening enough.
Participants:
Luke A. Nichter is an Associate Professor of History at Texas A&M University – Central Texas, and a
Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford’s Rothermere American Institute. He
earned in Ph.D. in Policy History from Bowling Green State University. Luke’s other publications
include the New York Times bestseller The Nixon Tapes: 1971-1972 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2014) and The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015), both coauthored with Douglas Brinkley. His current project is tentatively titled Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and
the Decline of the Eastern Establishment, to be published by Yale University Press.
Thomas Alan Schwartz is a Professor of History and Political Science at Vanderbilt University.
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Most recently he is the co-editor with Matthias Schulz, The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations
in the 1970s, (Cambridge University Press, 2009). He is currently working on a study of former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger entitled Henry Kissinger and the Dilemmas of American Power.
Nigel Bowles was from 2008-2015 Director of the Rothermere American Institute at the University
of Oxford. His research interests are in the United States Presidency. He is currently writing a book
about what the politics of American monetary policy from 1945-1988 show about Presidents’ use of
authority and power.
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou received his Ph.D. in International History from the London School of
Economics in 1992. He is Professor of Postwar History at the Department of History of the University
of Athens. He is a member of the Academic Committee of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for
Democracy; of the Publications Committee of the Eleftherios Venizelos Foundation; and of the GreekTurkish forum. His publications include Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952-1967
(London: Routledge, 2006), and NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc: Alliance Analysis
and Reporting, 1951-1969 (London: Routledge, 2014). He currently studies the NATO Committee on
the Challenges of Modern Society during the 1970s.
From 1973 to 1989 Geir Lundestad was professor of history and American civilization at the
University of Tromsø. From 1990 to 2014 he was Director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute and
Secretary of the Norwegian Nobel Committee (which awards the Nobel Peace Prize.) From 1991 to
2014 he was also an adjunct professor of international history at the University of Oslo. He has
published numerous books on international relations after 1945, particularly on the origins of the
Cold War and on transatlantic relations.

Review by Nigel Bowles, Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford
In his evaluation of the British Labour Party’s opposition to the terms on which Britain became a
member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, and of the Labour Government’s
renegotiation in 1974 and 1975 of those terms, Luke Nichter quotes an editorial comment of 5 April,
1974 in the Financial Times. The paper’s editorial writer noted that the
“death of President Pompidou and Foreign Secretary Callaghan’s speech April 1 on
renegotiating terms of entry have brought Europe to a period more dangerous and confused
than any since the mid-50s. Weak or uncertain governments in Britain, France and Germany;
nationalist bickering, menacing external pressures, both economic and military, weak
American government and energy crisis create a backdrop for the last act of
Götterdamerung” (178).
To observers of European politics in 2016, these themes from more than four decades ago have a
decided resonance. As the EEC was in the early 1970s, so in the second decade of the twenty-first
century the European Union (EU) appears to be in almost perpetual crisis. For all that the
international political and monetary orders in the two periods are dissimilar, U.S.-European relations
both then and now are characterized by discord. Nichter shows that President Richard Nixon and
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senior members of his administration resented the growing disparity between American defence
spending on European defence and European NATO members’ own low and declining expenditure;
President Barack Obama and senior members of his administration view European NATO members’
feeble expenditures similarly in 2016. External pressures were during Nixon’s administration indeed
‘menacing’; they remain so. In 1973-74, some of those external pressures originated in the Middle
East; in 2016, they do so with even greater turbulence and ramifying risk. If the governments of
Britain, France, and Germany did not then reliably demonstrate the combination of strategic grip and
resolution appropriate to the needs of the moment, they are in 2016 largely bereft of any such grip
and resolution. Edward Heath, the Conservative British Prime Minister for whom Britain’s EEC
membership was an absorbing political commitment, at least had a clear sense of strategic purpose in
matters European. For David Cameron, Heath’s Conservative successor as British Prime Minister in
2016, the quality of Britain’s relations with Europe have distilled into negotiations with Polish, Czech,
and Hungarian politicians about ‘in-work’ benefits for those of their nationals working in Britain.
Such are the shrivelled terms of conduct for British foreign policy in the twenty-first century.
Whatever else might be said of him, it cannot be said that Richard Nixon lacked strategic purpose.
The topic consumed him. And for all that he appeared to be preoccupied with questions of strategic
policy towards the Soviet Union and China in a world moving from bipolarity to tripolarity in nuclear
matters, Nixon made more serious attempts to engage with Europe than many gave him credit for,
either then or since. Nichter’s commanding book Richard Nixon and Europe is, accordingly,
thoroughly welcome. Nichter has to excellent effect used archival sources in Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. His legendary industry, which has made
possible the astonishing public good of transcribing Nixon’s taped conversations, finds comparative
archival and organizational expression in this admirable monograph. Learned though it is, Richard
Nixon and Europe is also a publication readily accessible to the wider reading public interested to
know more not just about what American policy towards Europe was but how it came about. The
chapters on the closing of the gold window in 1971, and on European responses to that extraordinary
act of policy, are outstanding pieces of historical analysis. So, too, is Nichter’s consideration of the
tension between the United States’ conduct of relations with European allies through the EEC and
NATO, and its bilateral relations with Britain, France, and Germany.
Nichter begins the concluding chapter to this fine book by quoting Nixon’s handwritten note to
himself on the occasion in June 1974 of the celebration at NATO Headquarters in Brussels of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Alliance’s creation: “It took great courage and statesmen to create… it
will take greater [courage] to preserve” (216). Nixon knew that the United States’ relations with
Europe were of the first importance to both sides. As Nichter shows, the President’s inheritance was
awkward: NATO had been weakened by France’s withdrawal from the alliance’s integrated military
command, and by the Alliance’s feeble indecision in the face of the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nixon thought his inheritance in European matters unacceptable and
unhelpful. Accordingly, he sought to reframe relations, culminating in his ‘Year of Europe.’
The question that necessarily follows is one to which Nichter appropriately devotes much time: why
did Nixon’s grand initiative in 1973, the year of British, Irish, and Danish accession to the
Community, fail? Here was a President, after all, for whom Europe mattered, and who knew why it
did. He came to office bent upon strengthening the NATO alliance. Once in office, he succeeded in reestablishing bilateral relations with France (which had left NATO’s integrated military command in

Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Roundtable XVII, 27 on Richard Nixon and Europe. The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World. HDiplo. 07-04-2016.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/132954/h-diplo-roundtable-xvii-27-richard-nixon-and-europe-reshaping
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

5

H-Diplo
1966). Nichter argues – indeed, he shows – that the vaunted ‘Year of Europe’ failed for four reasons:
First, because, the U.S. impaired its credibility with European allies not just because of its inability to
achieve a ceasefire in Vietnam but also because of Nixon’s decision to escalate bombing in Vietnam in
December 1972.
Second, because British leadership was inadequate. At No. 10, Edward Heath did not match his
commitment to British membership of the EEC with a clear-minded shaping of the implications of that
stance for Britain’s relationship with the United States. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office could
not compensate for that weakness because, in British government, no venture can long survive
without Prime Ministerial leadership that is both active and sustained.
Third, because France publicly opposed most of the Year of Europe initiative, particularly those
elements that provided for a timetable for closer European cooperation or that threatened Gaullist
sensitivities on defence cooperation.
And fourth, because the Social Democratic government in Germany sought a détente with the Soviet
Union on terms that Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger judged likely to be unacceptable to the United
States.
History does not offer repeat performances, but themes in relations between nation-states and
alliances nonetheless recur in modified forms. That is not the least of the lessons to be drawn from
Nichter’s searching and intelligent account of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe during Nixon’s
Presidency. More than four decades since Nixon resigned, to the extent that Europe still coheres as a
political force, it does so for the same reason that it has done ever since NATO’s creation in 1949 –
because of America’s security guarantee. Though formally confined to members of NATO, that
guarantee actually extends rather beyond them. Just how far and under what conditions it does so is,
alas, unclear. If we did not know that before 2014, we certainly know it in the aftermath of Russia’s
annexation of the Crimea and its suzerainty over eastern Ukraine.
United States Presidents and Secretaries of State have invariably found their European allies in
NATO and trading partners in the EEC and EU a source of irritation, as well they might. Kissinger’s
oft-cited frustration on the point of whom in Europe he might contact to discover the EEC’s policy on
any given matter remains au point. Except for trade, the EU has but weak common expressions of
external policy, as its flailing response to the Syrian and Libyan migration crises painfully reveals.
But the transatlantic relationship remains vital to the United States and its European partners for
reasons of politics, security, trade, and culture. Nixon understood that, as his predecessors in the
Oval Office had done, and his successors have in their turn also done. It is in the nature of things that
Europe needs American leadership but often finds its exercise inconvenient, overwhelming, or both.
That, for the United States, is but one of the burdens of its hegemony.

Review by Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, University of Athens
This is the first monograph that attempts to evaluate comprehensivelyPresident Richard Nixon’s
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impact on U.S.-European relations. As recent scholarship has argued, the late 1960s and the early
1970s was a period of important transitions. Apart from the move towards détente that raised huge
questions about the Cold-War international system, these years were marked by the transfer of Cold
War tensions to the global south– in other words, the full globalization of the Cold War. There was
also the growing significance of monetary, trade, and energy problems in international affairs, the
ascent of the human rights agenda, and the need for international scientific cooperation necessitated
by rapid technological progress in diverse issues that ranged from computers to satellites, and from
the Sea Bed to the environment. Moreover, the cycle of the West’s postwar economic expansion, the
trente glorieuses, was coming to an end. Sections of the new postwar generations were becoming
radicalized: they put forward new demands, sometimes ideologically confused, thus creating novel
problems over the legitimization of the postwar social systems. In other words, as we know now, this
was the beginning of the post-industrial era. It was natural that events of such magnitude would call
for major adjustments in the fabric of the postwar West.
[5]

This crisis of adjustment was handled by one of the most idiosyncratic presidents of the United
States, Richard Nixon, aided by another unique figure, Henry Kissinger, who – as the British noted –
was a ‘philosopher’ who was given huge powers by his chief as National Security Adviser and later
Secretary of State (132). In many respects, the Nixon-Kissinger team did not play by the rules; they
came to power with very clear ideas, and were prepared often to brush aside the State Department.
They scored impressive successes in their dealings with the West’s adversaries – the Soviet Union
and China – and ended the Vietnam War, but their policies, mostly towards small states, often
sparked adverse reactions. Regarding transatlantic relations, there is an excellent and growing
bibliography on the West’s policies in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
the Anglo-American special relationship, human rights and monetary problems, but there has not yet
appeared a comprehensive interpretation of Nixon’s full impact on what Nichter correctly terms on
the cover of the book as the “closest and most important alliance in the world,” at a time when “the
postwar period came to an end, and the modern era came to be on both sides of the Atlantic.” The
central question is relatively simple: Was the Nixon administration successful in adjusting intraWestern relationships to the new era? As usual in the history of international relations, simple
questions lead to complicated answers.
[6]

The book is based on extensive multi-archival research in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, as
well as the NATO, Council of Europe, and European Economic Community (EEC) archives. The author
has consulted a huge spectrum of published sources, while he places special emphasis on the White
House tapes, a large part of them published and co-edited by him in 2014-2015. Thus, he is in a
position to present an authoritative interpretation of Nixon’s European policies.
The author carefully defines his subject. In the introduction, he stresses that he does not present a
full account of transatlantic relations in those years; he seeks to show the ways in which Nixon
implemented his celebrated ‘Doctrine’ with regard to Europe (2-4). Thus, Nichter focuses on pivotal
issues, pointing to the President’s effort to effect a transformation of U.S. policies towards its closest
allies. This means that Nichter’s analysis inevitably focuses on the U.S. end of the relationship, also
taking into account the internal variables of American foreign policy, including the tendency toward
isolationism that Nixon and Kissinger sought to resist. The policies of the European powers or the
EEC and NATO processes are not the focus of the book.
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The first chapter discusses Nixon’s effort to adjust the security relationship with Europe. In early
1969, NATO was approaching its twentieth anniversary, and had managed to overcome the serious
crisis of French withdrawal from the military command. Nixon sought to revitalize the alliance. First,
he was instrumental in the setting up of NATO’s ‘Third Dimension’, namely, the Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) or NATO’s environmental program. However, the author
arguably overstates the impact of the CCMS in “holding together” the alliance (19). He then
discusses the U.S.-French defense cooperation of the early years of the Nixon administration, arguing
that this played a major role in reestablishing bilateral relations following a period of significant
strain. Last but not least, he explains the administration’s efforts to defeat the Mansfield
Amendments which called for a sharp reduction of US forces in Europe, and thus threatened to drive
a wedge between the U.S. and Europe on the most sensitive of all transatlantic Cold War topics – the
Europeans’ confidence in the American determination to defend Western Europe.
The following two chapters deal with the unilateral decision of the U.S. in 1971to end the Bretton
Woods system, and its after-effects. The author shows that the system had already posed important
problems for the U.S., which was now seeing its European and Japanese partners (but also trade
rivals) grow more quickly than itself, at a time when the dollar’s convertibility to gold effectively
meant that the U.S. subsidized its allies’ defense effort. In the end, West German growth and a huge
British demand to convert dollars to gold in the summer of 1971 forced Nixon into making the
decision, although, tellingly, no foreign policy official was present in the actual meetings. This
unilateral decision had serious repercussions in Europe, and threatened to destabilize transatlantic
relations. By the end of 1971, Kissinger tended to take over the deliberations with the Europeans,
trying to protect relations with them, and pushing the more aggressive (and prone to unilateralism)
Secretary of the Treasury, John Connally, to the sidelines. This is an excellent analysis of American
policy-making, showing the intensity of the dilemmas at a time when a whole economic cycle was
ending and new balances had to be sought; during such a transitory period, these balances would not
only be economic, but also political and even psychological.
The next chapters deal with the ill-fated Year of Europe. Nichter disputes the European allegation
that the initiative was undertaken unilaterally by Washington, but acknowledges that the Americans
“seemed to have little understanding of European integration” (113). He also concedes that Nixon’s
style of decision-making – mostly the tendency to surprise others by his announcements – was
perhaps more appropriate when dealing with adversaries rather than with allies (124). Instead of
celebrating transatlantic bonds, 1973 and early 1974 became a period of intra-allied tensions,
intensified by successive crises such as the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East and the first oil shock.
Nixon and Kissinger, also pressed by the growing difficulties in the Watergate front, came close to
believing that the EEC was striving to develop its distinct identity on an anti-American basis, and
questioned the wisdom of American support to the European integration project. It took great effort
to reach a new psychological balance, with the issuing of the Atlantic declaration in mid-1974. The
last two chapters deal with a primarily European problem – Britain’s renegotiation of its entry terms
in the EEC. Washington fervently supported the continuing British membership of the EEC, which
would allow the country to remain “committed to an active international role” (197). Thus,
Washington effectively returned to a line of support for the European project. Still, this issue, more
European than American in substance, could be discussed in a single, rather than in two chapters.
Nichter offers a convincing picture of the Nixon administration’s efforts to place the transatlantic
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relationship on a new basis, consistent with the less maximalist policies that the President wanted to
pursue globally. He argues that Nixon’s efforts were in the end successful. This is a convincing
argument, although there are aspects which might deserve more analysis. Had the author engaged
more extensively with existing European historiography, a more balanced and better informed
argument would have emerged: the book focuses mostly on the formulation of U.S. policies, but the
European end of the equation is not equally covered. Moreover, a more extensive treatment of the
CSCE negotiations and the changing U.S. and European roles in that process might have enriched
the argument. The author could also place more emphasis on a constant European complaint of these
years, namely the apparent reluctance of the White House to understand the difference between
consultation with the allies and mere notification of them – something which tended to reinforce a
sense of constant Nixonian unilateralism in dealing with Europe.
In sum, this was an era of huge transitions in international affairs, which could not but have a major
impact on transatlantic relations. Arguably, it was also natural that misunderstandings or hiccups
would occuron both sides of the Atlantic. During such a tense and dense historical time, when trends
of globalization were dramatically intensifying, the necessary adjustments could only be made
through a measure of tension. Having enjoyed an uninterrupted period of economic ascent, and in the
midst of organizing a political expression of their supranational union, the members of the EEC often
felt ignored by their major ally who was engaging in dangerously close contacts with the Soviet
adversary. On their side of the relationship, Nixon and Kissinger often felt let down by the Europeans
(for example in the Yom Kippur War), while they also complained that the Europeans wanted to take
distances from the Americans, whom they expected to remain fully committed to Europe’s defense.
Perhaps the best commentary on Nixon’s foreign policy is that it was “at once revolutionary in its
methods and conservative in its aims.” This is fully evident in U.S.-European relations as well,
although the revolutionary methods tended to make the Europeans anxious. In other words, the
stakes of those years were high: the two sides of the Atlantic needed to find a new point of balance,
incorporating their own evolution and change as well as the new institutional peculiarities of
European integration.
[7]

Eventually, however, they did. It is possible that the existence of a common adversary – the Soviet
Union – also played a role in this process, and this is why the Cold War was so important even during
this stage of détente. But it was not only that. The main reason evidently lay in the fact that the U.S.
and the European allies were like-minded states, in a generally similar stage of development, and had
common values and interests to defend in the new era. The style of Nixon and Kissinger created
problems of communication, but Nichter correctly argues that they were successful in pushing things
to a conclusion. Perhaps the greatest commentary on their policies is the respect that the Europeans
showed for them – but mostly after they had been safely out of office.

Review by Geir Lundestad, Norwegian Nobel Institute (1990-2014)
Most books have some strong sides and some weak sides. This is certainly also the case with Luke
Nichter’s Richard Nixon and Europe. The strongest side is quite clearly the archival sources the
author has consulted. This is no surprise since Nichter has a strong background in editing and
publishing sources. Nichter has looked at the archives of the European Commission and of NATO in
[8]
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Belgium, the presidential archives at the Archives nationales in Paris and the relevant archives at the
Council of Europe in Strasbourg, at archives of the Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin, the European Union
files in Florence, the National Archives in London, and a wide range of American private, presidential
and National Archives materials. He has also consulted all the obvious published government
documents, memoirs, periodicals, and books. Nichter puts long extracts from these sources into his
text (59-63, 76-82). This gives us the impression of coming close particularly to President Richard
Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Arthur
Burns. Nichter is better on economics than on politics and focuses more on the United States than on
the leading European powers, with the partial exception of the United Kingdom.
The weakest part of the book is the lack of a clear central thesis. The reader is never entirely certain
what the main argument of the book is. The starting point is apparently that Nichter wants to do for
Nixon what Thomas Schwartz did for Lyndon Johnson in his Lyndon Johnson and Europe. Schwartz
was able to show that right in the middle of the Vietnam War, Johnson pursued a rather nuanced and
successful policy towards the main European allies, including President Charles de Gaulle’s France.
[9]

Nichter’s book follows a circuitous route, but it is not clear where it actually ends up. The author
starts off by stating that on January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon’s first day as president, “U.S.-European
relations were at the lowest point that they had been at any time since the end of World War II,” a
considerable overstatement if one thinks of Suez Crisis in 1956 and de Gaulle taking France out of
NATO’s military integration (1). This view also represents an indirect rejection of the success of
President Johnson, and thereby also of the work of Nichter’s mentor Tom Schwartz. Then Nichter
spells out the bold new initiatives which Nixon undertook to relieve the crisis: he strengthened ties
with the NATO partners, particularly with de Gaulle’s France; Nixon acted with boldness to alleviate
the financial situation of the United States and thereby brought about the “birth of the modern age of
globalization,” another major overstatement; through the Year of Europe Nixon encouraged the
European Community (EC) “to become more outward looking at a time of inward development and
expansion” (4); Nixon believed ”the EC was stronger with Britain as a member due to Britain’s longer
engagement with the world than other Europeans” and through his and National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger’s efforts “Britain remained tethered to both the EC and the United States, but
especially Europe” (5).
Yet, at the end of the book it is evident that Nichter thinks that Nixon pretty much failed in his
efforts. He writes that the foreign policy Nixon and Kissinger pursued was based on “attributes that
were contrary to Atlanticism: they shifted the focus of American attention and creativity from West to
East, they prioritized bilateral diplomacy, they subordinated transatlantic relations to opportunities
with adversaries such as China and the Soviet Union, and they sought to preserve American
dominance as the world transitioned to a more diffuse place” (218). Transatlantic relations
diminished in importance compared to other regions of the world: “the decline of Europe as an
American foreign policy priority had more to do with the Nixon reorientation of American foreign
policy to the East than the decline of the United States as a result of Vietnam” (219), as if the two
points stand in opposition to each other.
The final sentence of the book is the following: “Europe remained an important partner, but the shift
to a Pacific strategy forever changed the relationship among the Atlantic allies” (219). 1969 had
allegedly been the lowest point in transatlantic relations. Now we read that at the end of Nixon’s
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abbreviated term “the year 1974 was the most turbulent in Nixon-era transatlantic relations. U.S.European ties were at the lowest point since World War II after the failure of the Year of Europe”
(158). The Anglo-American relationship was “threadbare” (158); the Franco-German moteur that had
driven European integration “was stalled” (158); we even read that “Over time, Nixon’s preferred
style of diplomacy seemed increasingly incompatible with transatlantic relations, “which were based
on traditional diplomacy, consultation, and a greater degree of transparency” (124). The governments
of the United States, Britain, France, and Germany all fell in the first half of 1974. So, the
achievements of Nixon and Kissinger towards Europe were meager indeed.
“However, by mid-1975, the situation was significantly improved” (158). Somewhat paradoxically and
surprisingly, President Gerald Ford seems to be the real, but highly unanticipated hero in this book
on Richard Nixon. The process of European integration was relaunched by German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt and French President Giscard d’Estaing, the Anglo-American relationship was
considerably strengthened when Ford and Prime Minister Harold Wilson replaced Nixon and Edward
Heath. Nichter concludes that, in fact, “The year 1975 marked the beginning of a time of more
harmonious bilateral political relations between the United States and France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom” (158). This is all rather confusing. Gone are the structural factors that had so
harmed transatlantic relations under Nixon. Now the emphasis is on personalities, and much of the
credit for the improved climate has to go to Gerald Ford, the “relative unknown in the White House”
(158). Ford, Schmidt, Giscard, and Wilson, and from 1976 Prime Minister James Callaghan, enjoyed
each other’s company and remained friends even after they had all left office. Gone was not only
Nixon himself, but also John Connally who had done so much to mess up transatlantic relations with
his strident approach.
As already suggested, there are many questionable statements in Nichter’s book. He argues that
“the Year of Europe was the most ambitious plan to improve Atlantic unity since the Marshall Plan”
(157). One could think instead of the founding of NATO. His analysis of why the Year of Europe failed
is more accurate (156-157). Britain under Heath was eager to be accepted by its new EC partners,
West Germany under Chancellor Willy Brandt was focused on its Ostpolitik, and France under
President Georges Pompidou had its own agenda. The United States was increasingly influenced by
the scandal that helped doom the Year of Europe – Watergate. The European responses to Nixon’s
economic measures of August 1971 “were the origins of the European Monetary System, from which
a common currency was created” (70). This is simply stated; no effort is made to bear this out. It is
strange that in such a short book two full chapters, ranging from pages 158-215, are devoted to the
British election of 1974 and the country’s referendum on the EC in 1975, with relative little emphasis
on the American role in these events.
Nichter touches upon Nixon’s feeling of American decline, but does not give it the attention it
deserves. Nixon returned to this topic time and again. Thus, he referred to the earlier American
domination and the Soviet challenge and then stated that instead of there being just two
superpowers, “When we think in economic terms and economic potentialities, there are five great
power centers in the world today,” The United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, China, and
Japan. And, again, “I think of what happened to Greece and Rome; what is left – only the pillars.” The
1970s was clearly the decade when the references to the decline of the United States were strongest
and most numerous.
[10]
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With a relatively weakened United States, Washington had simply come to doubt its own emphasis on
Europe’s integration. In Kissinger’s words “A confederal Europe would enable the United States to
maintain influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting
the views of a single, supranational body.” The paradox was that when Britain finally had in Edward
Heath a Prime Minister who wanted to bring Britain into the EC, Washington had lost much of its
interest. It did not really encourage the EC institutions. Again, as Kissinger stated, “If the price for
this is that we cannot talk with our traditional European friends, then over time this could create a
massive change in our relations. “J. Robert Schaetzel, U.S. ambassador to the EC in the years from
1966 to 1972 was a true believer in the European integration process and saw Washington’s response
at close hand. In his memoirs, not mentioned by Nichter, Schaetzel complained that in the Nixon
years “in its isolation in Brussels the United States Mission to the European Communities might as
well have been located on the upper reaches of the Orinoco.”
[11]

Author’s Response by Luke A. Nichter, Texas A&M University–Central Texas
I would like to thank Nigel Bowles, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, and Geir Lundestad for reading my work,
providing stimulating feedback, and challenging me to think about transatlantic relations during the
Nixon years in different ways. Also, I would like to thank the editors of H-Diplo, and especially
Thomas Maddux, for commissioning such an esteemed group of reviewers for this roundtable. To
Thomas Schwartz I can offer no thanks here that has not been expressed in the book already, but my
appreciation is due, once again, for contributing the introduction to this roundtable.
[12]

Shortly after the publication of Thomas Schwartz’s Lyndon Johnson and Europe (1), I was in that
place as a graduate student that we have all been in: I was searching anxiously for a long-term
research topic. Nothing was holding my attention, yet I knew that, in the marriage-without-love that
was to become my dissertation, I needed to work on something that would motivate me to trudge
again and again to the library in the Ohio winter snow. I hoped to do something multi-archival, on the
archival frontier, from an international perspective. I was lucky to have received a lot of good advice
from dissertation committee members Douglas Forsyth and Gary Hess, but it was not until I read
Johnson and Europe that the final tumbler of the lock fell into place in my mind. It is still hard for me
to believe, a decade later, that we are talking about the result – Richard Nixon and Europe.
The reviewers were generous in their praise and gentle with their criticism. There are a few times
when we are saying – or at least intending – different things. Some statements in the book could have
been framed in better ways. But I welcome the discussion to which my work contributes – regardless
of whether we agree on the greatest crisis in postwar transatlantic relations, why President Richard
Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took certain actions or said certain things based on
what I heard on the Nixon tapes, or whether my work rejects Johnson and Europe. (I do not think that
it does, only that Nixon and Kissinger did not inherit a transatlantic relationship as sound as it
seemed.) There is room for debate and disagreement. My primary goal has been to move the ball
down the field and advance the historiography.
I agree that the book is circuitous, in part because Nixon’s transatlantic policy was. Due to the
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sudden starts and stops in policy momentum, changing priorities, and the shifting impact of domestic
policy, a simple thesis cannot capture the required nuance. The time and space that Nixon and
Kissinger had for U.S.-European policy was directly related to how much time and space was being
consumed by other crises and priorities. Like Johnson, Nixon had to deal with the Vietnam War, but
during the Nixon era numerous other issues also significantly impacted transatlantic relations:
détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, the protracted collapse of Bretton Woods,
the expansion of the European Community, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the energy crisis, and
Watergate. Some were self-inflicted wounds, to be sure.
I once had a chance to discuss Nixon-era transatlantic relations with Henry Kissinger. It is not a
subject that Kissinger has written much about. Whereas Johnson fared better than perhaps we
expected, Nixon and Kissinger fell short in the area of the world they were arguably most
knowledgeable and best prepared. “That was a great disappointment,” Kissinger summarized about
the Year of Europe in particular. And that is the same feeling I get, and the one I pass on to readers
of this book: some successes, some failures, but primarily missed opportunities.
[13]
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